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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
DUANE P. RUSSELL and VER-
LENE RUSSELL, his wife, and 
JOHN DALE RUSSELL, 
Plaintiffs and Appellants, 
vs. 
HOOPER IRRIGATION COM-
P ANY, et al, 
Defendants and Respondents. 
APPELLANTS' BRIEF 
No. 
10929 
STATEl\'IENT OF THE KIND OF CASE 
This is an action in trespass for compensatory and 
punitive damages. 
DISPOSITION IN LO,iVER COURT 
The District Court granted a summary judgment 
against the plaintiffs and appellants. 
1 
RELIEF SOUGII'l' ON APPEAL 
The appellants seek reversal and remand for trial. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Appellants and their predecessors in interest have 
for more than 7 5 years, last past, been owners and 
operators in common with others of a lateral from the 
Main Hooper Irrigation Company Canal. During the 
above period the lateral has been used to carry water to 
appellants' land for irrigation purposes. 
The Hooper Irrigation Company is a mutual irri-
gation company engaged in distributing water to its 
stockholders. The individual defendants are persons 
who were present and participating in the acts of 
December 7, 1959 which are described below. 
In chronological order is a statement of events 
which occurred. 
December 7, 1959-Respondents, wilfully, mali-
ciously, wrongfully and without consent of appellants 
and without authorization, moved heavy machinery and 
equipment on the lateral, filled a large portion of the 
lateral with earth and moved and destroyed several 
concrete and steel headgates and other water control 
facilities in said lateral. ( R. 1 and 14) . 
January 15, 1960-Respondent, Hooper Irriga-
tion Company, filed suit (Civil No. 35984) pursuant 
to Sections 73-1-6 and 73-1-7, Utah Code Annotated, 
2 
1953, to condemn appellants' easements, rights of way 
and other property rights so that an irrigation ditch 
could be expanded and changed. 
January 26, 1960-Appellants filed this action 
against respondents seeking compensatory and punitive 
damages for respondents' actions of December 7, 1959 
-filling in the lateral and removing and destroying 
headgates and water control facilities. (R. 1). 
January 27, 1960-Respondent, Hooper Irriga-
tion Company, obtained an order of occupancy relating 
to the property in question in this lawsuit. (R. 3). 
April 3, 1963-The condemnation action was tried. 
December 15, 1966-Respondent filed a motion 
for summary judgment and the court granted respond-
ents' motion for summary judgment, included the 
record and file in the case of Hooper Irrigation Com-
pany vs. Russell, et al, Civil No. 35984, District Court 
of Weber County, State of Utah, in the record of the 
present case and dismissed appellants' complaint with 
prejudice on May 4, 1967. (R. 18). The plaintiffs 
appealed. 
STATEJ\1ENT OF POINTS 
1. It was error to grant a summary judgment where 
there are genuine issues of material fact between the 
parties. 
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2. There are genuine issues of material fact be-
tween the appellants and the respondent, Hooper Irri-
gation Company, which have not been settled. 
3. There are genuine issues of material fact be-
tween the appellants and the individual respondents 
which have not been settled. 
ARGUMENT 
I. IT WAS ERROR TO GRANT A SUM-
MARY JUDGMENT WHERE THERE ARE 
GENUINE ISSUES OF MATERIAL FACT 
BETWEEN THE PARTIES. 
In determining whether a motion for summary 
judgment should be granted, both the statutory and 
case law are clear. Rule 56 ( c) of the Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure states that a summary judgment shall 
be rendered if "the pleadings, depositions and admis-
sions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show 
that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact 
and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment 
as a matter of law." 
The cases hold that summary judgment is proper 
only if the pleadings, depositions, affidavits, and ad-
missions show that there is no genuine issue of material 
fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judg-
ment as a matter of law. See In re Williams Estate, 
IO Utah 2d 83, 348 P.2d 683; Dupler vs. Yates, IO 
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Utah 2d. 251, 351 P.2d 624; Brandt vs. Springville 
Banking Co., 10 Utah 2d 350, 353 P.2d 460. 
In construing Rule 56 ( c), the Utah Supreme 
Court in Thompson vs. Ford Motor Company, 16 
Utah 2d. 30, 395 P.2d 62, stated, "On summary judg-
ment the adverse party is entitled to have the court 
survey the evidence and all reasonable inferences fairly 
to be drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to 
h . " Im. 
2. TIIERE ARE GENUINE ISSUES OF MA-
TERIAL FACT BETWEEN THE APPEL-
LANTS AND THE RESPONDENT, HOOPER 
IRRIGATION COMPANY, WHICH HAVE 
NOT BEEN SETTLED. 
In looking at the record, it is apparent that there 
are issues of material fact which are disputed by the 
l?arties and which have not been settled by prior liti-
gation. 
Appellants in their complaint (R. 1) and the 
amendment to the complaint (R. 17) alleged owner-
ship of the lateral and "That on December 7, 1959 
the defendants wilfully, maliciously, and wrongfully 
and without consent of the plaintiffs", placed heavy 
equipment on the lateral, filled a large portion of it 
in and removed and destroyed numerous concrete and 
steel headgates and other water control facilities in the 
lateral. 
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Respondents did not file an answer but in the 
affidavit of James M. Johnston, submitted in support 
of the motion for summary judgment (R. 7) it is 
stated in paragraph 4: 
"4. Prior to the securing of the Order of Occu-
pancy on or about February 15, 1960, in the 
companion condemnation action between Hooper 
Irrigation Company and these plaintiffs, no 
equiJ>ment, laborers, or other manner of activity 
was commenced, continued or had upon any 
of the real properties of the plaintiffs in this 
action, or to any improvements located upon said 
real properties." 
In the Duane P. Russell affidavit (R. 14) appel-
lants state that the allegations of James M. Johnston 
quoted above are "not true and that in fact the defend-
ant entered upon the land of the plaintiff without per-
mission from the land owners and without order of 
the court and wilfully and maliciously did substantial 
damage.'' 
It is clear that there is an issues of fact as to when 
the respondents entered appellants' land and when the 
damages occurred as the two affidavits take opposite 
positions on this point. There is no other evidence in 
the record which could prove the date in question. Thus, 
a reasonable inference that respondents entered upon 
appellants' land on December 7, 1959, can be drawn 
without the necessity of considering the evidence in 
the light most favorable to the appellant as Thompson 
vs. Ford Motor Company, 16 Utah 2d. 30, 395 P.2d 62 
permits. 
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The issue of time of entry is material because the 
complaint alleges a trespass-the unauthorized entry 
upon the realty of another to the damage thereof. The 
entry and damage occurred on December 7, 1959 as 
alleged in the complaint, (R. l), filed on January 26, 
1960. The condemnation suit was filed by respondent, 
Hooper Irrigation Company, pursuant to 73-1-6 and 
73-1-7, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, and on January 
15, 1960 and the order of occupancy was obtained on 
January 27, 1960 (R. 3). Thus, without appellants' 
consent, respondents had no legal right to enter ap-
pellants' property and fill in the lateral and destroy 
and remove the headgates on December 7, 1959. As 
alleged in the complaint (R. l) no such consent was 
given by appellants and since neither the condemna-
tion proceedings had been filed nor an order of occu-
pancy obtained, respondents would be trespassers if 
they entered appellants' land on December 7, 1959. 
This would give rise to a cause of action in tres-
pass as every trespass gives rise to at least nominal 
damages, 87 C.J.S. 1061. Where compensatory dam-
ages are proved they may also be recovered and puni-
tive damages can be recovered in addition. The above 
damages were alleged in the complaint. (R. l). 
It should further be pointed out that the issues 
in this case were not settled in the condemnation suit. 
In that suit, the only issue submitted to the jury were 
as follows: 
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1. The value of the construction easement on de-
fendants' land. 
2. Damage to the Russells' irrigation easement in 
the public street, if any. 
3. Loss of value to the Russells' lands severed by 
easement, because of project, if any. (R. 7). 
Nothing was submitted to the jury as to damages to 
such tangible property as concrete and steel headgates 
and other water control facilities. These facilities on 
the easement were destroyed before the order of occu-
pancy was granted. 
Section 73-34-11, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, 
states the time at which a right to damages in a con-
demnation suit accrues: 
"For the purpose of assessing compensation 
and damages, the right thereto shall be deemed 
to have accrued at the date of the service of sum-
mons, and its actual value at that date shall be 
the measure of compensation for all property 
to be actually taken, and the basis of damages 
to property not actually taken, but injuriously 
affected, in all cases where such damages are 
allowed, as provided in the next preceding sec-
tion. No improvements put upon the property 
subsequent to the date of service of summons 
shall be included in the assessment of compen-
sation or damages." 
In State Road Commission vs. Woolley, 15 Utah 
2d. 248, 390 P.2d 860, it was held: 
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"Owner of property condemned is entitled to 
the fair market value of that property at time 
summons is served, and all factors bearing upon 
such value that any prudent purchaser would 
take into account at that time should be given 
consideration including any potential develop-
ment in the area reasonably to be expected." 
See also Weber Basin Water Conservancy Dis-
trict vs. Ward, IO Utah 2d. 29, 347 P.2d 862. 
In the present case the summons was served about 
January 15, 1960. At that time the lateral was largely 
filled in and the headgates and water control facilities 
had been removed and destroyed. Appellants' answer 
to respondents' condemnation suit did not contain a 
counterclaim for the damage alleged in this suit nor 
did it alleges such damage. The jury did not decide 
the issues of fact concerning this damage. 
Respondents' condemnation suit condemned ap-
pellants' property in the condition it was in when the 
summons was served and the damages were awarded 
on that basis. Respondents' order of occupancy related 
to a partially filled in lateral in which the headgates 
had been removed and destroyed. Anything occurring 
before the summons was served had no bearing upon 
the measure of damages in the condemnation suit as 
such measure of damages is set as of the time the sum-
mons is served. 
On December 7, 1959, more than a month before 
service of the summons, appellants were the owners 
of the lateral, headgates, and water control facilities. 
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They could have moved the headgates or water control 
facilities to another place if they so desired. That is, 
they were entitled to complete control as to use and 
possession of those items until at least the time the 
~ummons was served. This control was unlawfully 
interfered with by respondents before respondents had 
ever filed suit against appellants. 
It should also be noted that appellants have pleaded 
and asked for an award of punitive damages. Neither 
this issue, nor the award of such damages was considered 
in the condemnation suit. 
3. THERE ARE GENUINE ISSUES OF 
MATERIAL FACT BETWEEN THE APPEL-
LANTS AND THE INDIVIDUAL RESPOND-
ENTS WHICH HA VE NOT BEEN SETTLED. 
The complaint in the present case, Civil No. 36014, 
( R. 17) lists the following parties: Duane P. Russell 
and Verlene Russell, his wife and John Dale Russell, 
plaintiffs, vs. Hooper Irrigation Company, a corpora-
tion, Leet Parker, George Fowers, Orson Christensen, 
Lyle Parker, Roland Parker, Harold Jackson, Jesse 
F. Paraday, Shikazo Y dmushita, George Hunt, C. P. 
Higley, Ray Widdison and Sadao Sam Miya, defend-
ants. The complaint further states: 
"5. That on December 7, 1959, the defendants, 
wilfully, maliciously and wrongfully and without 
the consent of the plaintiffs, or any of them, 
placed heavy earth-moving machin~ry. and equip-
ment on the said lateral of the plamtiffs, filled a 
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large porton of the lateral with earth, and re-
moved and destroyed numerous concrete and 
steel headgates and other water-control facilities 
in said latera]; all to the damage of the plaintiffs' 
in the amount of $5,000.00 actual damages and 
$5,000.000 punitive damages." 
The complaint in the condemnation case, Civil No. 
35984, (R. 3) lists the following parties: Hooper Irri-
gation Company, plaintiff, vs. Charles Ray Pinkham 
and Jessie Pinkham, husband and wife; Effie J. Hoo-
per; John Dale Russell and Frances Russell, husband 
and wife; and Duane P. Russell and Verlene Russell, 
husband and wife, defendants. 
Of all the parties listed, only appellants and re-
spondent, Hooper Irrigation Company, appear in both 
the condemnation case and the present case. The rest 
of the respondents were not parties to the condemna-
tion suit. Therefore, any issue settled in the condem-
nation suit would not be binding as between appellants 
and those respondents who were not parties to the con-
demnation suit. It is clear from the portion of the com-
plaint set out above that this action is against all re-
spondents, not merely the corporate respondent, Hooper 
Irrigation Company. 
Appellants have not had a chance to prove the 
wrongful acts and malicious and wilful misconduct of 
these respondents in court. Therefore, the summary 
judgment must be reversed. 
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CONCLUSION 
Material issues of fact are raised in the complaint 
and the affidavits. The question of when respondents 
entered appellants' property is raised and left un-
answered. This question is material because the time 
of entry determines the legal rights. This question was 
not settled by the condemnation suit because it was 
not raised in that suit. The condemnation suit only 
considered the property as of the date the summons 
was served and the damage complained herein occurred 
before the summons was served. Even if the con-
demnation suit did settle any issues involved in the 
present case, it could not bind appellants as to those 
respondents who were not parties to the condemnation 
suit. For these reasons the summary judgment should 
be reversed and a trial of the case on the merits should 
be directed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
E. J. SKEEN 
522 Newhouse Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Attorney for Appellants 
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